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THE ISSUE OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Forty-five years after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights the international community met in Vienna to elaborate the
human rights agenda for the next twenty-five years. The second United
Nations World Conference on Human Rights was intended to focus on the
implementation of the human rights standards that had been adopted since
the Universal Declaration, but found itself challenged instead by a number of
Asian countries on the very issue of the universality of these rights, which
they argued reflected Western values and not their own.
Paragraph 5, inter alia, of the Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action,' reaffirmed the universality of human rights using the English
language in such a way that only a non-native-English speaker could
appreciate:
Paragraph 5: All human rights are universal, indivisible
and interdependent and inter-related. The international
community must treat human rights globally in a fair and
equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same
emphasis. While the significance of national and regional
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious
backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of
States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural
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systems, to promote and protect all human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
What was the content behind the Asian challenge? The response to
the Asian challenge set forth in the Vienna Declaration was obscured in the
deliberate imprecision of the language.
In two earlier attempts to
comprehend the nature of the Asian challenge, I came to the following
conclusions. 2 First, that the Asians were in agreement with the West on
certain "minimal standards of civilized behavior," for example:
there should be no torture, no slavery, no arbitrary
killings, no disappearances in the middle of the night, no
shooting
down of
innocent demonstrators,
no
imprisonment without careful review. These rights should
be upheld not only for moral reasons. There are sound
functional reasons. Any society which is at odds with its
best and brightest and shoots them down when they
demonstrate peacefully, as Myanmar did, is headed for
trouble. Most Asian societies do not want to be in the
position that Myanmar is in today, a nation at odds with
3
itself.
And second, that the disagreements resided in an area that I termed
the "private sphere" which relates to the personal life of the individual.
These rights have traditionally been covered by religious law and they still
are in many countries. 4 This private sphere, which deals with issues such as
religion, culture, the status of women, the right to marry, to divorce, and to
remarry, the protection of children, the question of choice as regards family
planning, and other issues which are still highly controversial in the West,
such as sexual preference, abortion, and euthanasia, is a domain in which the
most serious challenges to the definition of human rights arise and, more
particularly, to the universality of such rights.5

2. See Christina M. Cerna, Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity:
Implementation of Human Rights in Different Socio-Cultural Contexts, 16 HUM. RTs. Q. 740-52
(1994) [hereinafter Cerna, Universality of Human Rights]; Christina M. Cerna, East Asian
Approaches to Human Rights, 89 AsIL PROC. 146 (1995), and 1995-1996 BuFF. J. INT'L L. 2
[hereinafter Cerna, East Asian Approaches].
3. Kishore Mahbubani, An Asian Perspective on Human Rights and Freedom of the Press,
quoted in Cerna, Universality of Human Rights, supra note 2.
4. Religious law, or Shari'a, is prominent in many Islamic states; Judaic law is prominent
in Israel; Canonic law is prominent in the Holy Sea, and penetrates the legal thinking of many
states with large Christian populations.
5. See Cerna, Universality of Human Rights, supra note 2, at 746.
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So where does the death penalty fit into this discussion of the
universality of human rights? The goals behind the imposition of the death
penalty are basically two: retribution and deterrence. Society exacts its
pound of flesh from the perpetrators of the most atrocious crimes set forth in
the criminal law and which generally involve the violent, premeditated
taking of life; this is retribution writ large, and is profoundly entrenched in
Western conceptions of justice. Lex talionis, the principle or law of
retaliation that a punishment inflicted should correspond in degree and kind
to the offense of the wrongdoer, as an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, is
part of the Judeo-Christian baggage which informs our notions of morality
and of what is right.6 If an offender has taken a life, it is considered just that
he forfeit his life; there is symmetry and equality between the punishment
and the offense.
So my first point is that I would place the death penalty into the area
I termed the "private sphere." Unless one believes in such religiouslycharged definitions of justice it is not immediately or necessarily clear or
self-evident what should be done with a wrongdoer who commits a
homicide. Some countries seek to provide a form of compensation for the
victim's relatives in the form of monetary damages provided by the state (or
the labor of the perpetrator) which gives them something tangible beyond the
vaguer satisfaction arising from the imprisonment or execution of the
wrongdoer. My point here is that if we remove the religious connotations
from the concept of justice we are left with more pragmatic attempts to seek
to compensate the victim. Justice, having removed God and the concomitant
absolutes from the equation, is more difficult to define in human or human
rights terms.
Take, for example, the case of a judge who errs and mistakenly
sends an innocent man to the gallows. The judge has taken a life, is it just
that he forfeit his own? It is unlikely that any society would devise such a
solution.
If our notions of justice are culturally determined and informed by
religious precepts, as I am suggesting that they are, then if we strip awdy

6. Albert Camus, in his celebrated essay on capital punishment, Reflections on the
Guillotine, refers to the "quasi-arithmetical" reply of society to wrongdoers, and denies that the
law of retaliation is a principle.
That reply is as old as man; it is called the law of retaliation. Whoever has done me
harm must suffer harm; whoever has put out my eye must lose an eye; and whoever
has killed must die. This is an emotion, and a particularly violent one, not a principle.
Law, by definition, cannot obey the same rules as nature.
Albert Camus, Reflections on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION AND DEATH (Justin
O'Brien trans., 1960).
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these preconceptions, we find that there is no inevitability or necessity in
requiring the death penalty for the taking of a life.
This brings me to the second point that I wish to make.
The law presents us with a paradox. The international community
has reached consensus on the abolition of torture, no country in the world
allows its police or other state agents to torture as a means of obtaining
information or for any other reason. It is prohibited in all criminal codes in
every country in the world. Yet the same international consensus has not
been reached on the abolition of the death penalty which is arguably the most
extreme form of torture.,
The death penalty is specifically excluded from the international
torture conventions. For example, the United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
defines torture in article 1 as:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture"
means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or
a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only
from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
(Emphasis added.)
Consequently, since the death penalty is considered a "lawful
sanction" in many states, the international human rights organizations
seeking the abolition of the death penalty cannot attack the death penalty, per
se, since it is not defined as an arbitrary deprivation of the right to life, and it
is explicitly excluded from the definition of torture.
The 1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture
goes a step further than the United Nations in its definition of torture. In
article 2 of this treaty, torture is defined as:
7. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the American Convention on
Human Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights all include the death penalty as
an exception to the arbitrary deprivation of the right to life. It should be noted, however, that
each of these treaties has been "amended" by an additional protocol on the abolition of the death
penalty which are only in force for the ratifying states parties.
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any act intentionally performed whereby physical or
mental pain or suffering is inflicted on a person for
purposes of criminal investigation, as a means of
intimidation, as personal punishment, as a preventive
measure, as a penalty, or for any other purpose. Torture
shall also be understood to be the use of methods upon a
person intended to obliterate the personality of the victim
or to diminish his physical or mental capacities even if
they do not cause physical pain or mental anguish.
The OAS treaty specifically excluded lawful measures from its
definition of torture, but it included a proviso: "The concept of torture shall
not include physical or mental pain or suffering that is inherent in or solely
the consequence of lawful measures, provided that they do not include the
performance of the acts or use of the methods referred to in this article."
(Emphasis added).
The proviso explicitly allows abolitionists to challenge the death
penalty by creating arguments that the manner of imposition of the death
penalty, i.e. the suffering inherent in a slow, painful death, is tantamount to
torture, or the delay in carrying out an execution due to defense driven
appeals is tantamount to torture, insofar as the manner or the delay create a
disproportionate amount of suffering for the wrongdoer.
In sum, we are left with the irony that the death penalty retentionist
states now seek to impose capital punishment in such a way as to cause the
condemned individual a minimum amount of suffering.
Last week, for example, a British pro bono lawyer contacted the
Commission on behalf of an individual on death row in Missouri. Britain,
which has abolished the death penalty, now provides technical assistance to
United States lawyers working on death penalty cases. This lawyer was
seeking to prove that "the combination and cumulative effect" of enduring a
period in excess of thirteen and a half years on death row, the staying of
three separate Warrants of Execution in the final days prior to the scheduled
execution dates, the initiation and progression of the "Missouri execution
protocol" to within one hour and forty-six minutes of a scheduled execution,
and the issuance of seven Warrants of Execution in total, amounted to cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment under the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and under international human
rights law.
All these stays were defense driven and hence one could argue that
the delays in the imposition of the death penalty were voluntary, and
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consequently could not be defined as torture.A In addition, they were all acts
incidental to or inherent in lawful sanctions. Some courts, however, have
interpreted such acts, although pursuant to law, as violative of international
human rights standards.9
In 1993, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London
reversed an earlier holding and found that a delay in the imposition of the
death penalty caused by the Appellant's legitimate right to appeal cannot be
blamed on the prisoner. In Pratt Morgan v. Attorney Generalfor Jamaica
the Privy Council stated that:
It was part of the human condition that a condemned man
would take every opportunity to save his life through use
of appellate procedure. If it enabled the prisoner to
prolong the appellate hearings over a period of years, the
fault was to be attributed to the appellate system that
permitted such delay and not to the prisoner who took
advantage of it.
The logical conclusion is that it is the death penalty that should be
abolished, in the same way that torture, which in earlier more barbaric times
was considered a lawful and legitimate means of punishment, has now been
abolished in the law. Of course, torture continues to be practiced in many
countries in the world but the point is that it is not permitted in any legal
system in the world. The first step is to abolish the death penalty, de jure,
and then to abolish it de facto.
The third and final point I wish to make deals with the question of
whether the international community is nearer to a consensus on the issue of
prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles under the age of
eighteen? The international human rights treaties explicitly prohibit the
imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by persons below the
8.

I use the terms "torture" and "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment"

interchangeably.
9. Since 1978 some prisoners in the United States have challenged their conditions of
imprisonment on death row as an infringement of their rights under the Eighth Amendment. In
Texas, as a result of Ruiz v. Estelle (1982), a class action in which the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that the vastly overcrowded conditions under which all Texan prisoners were held
violated the Eighth Amendment, agreement was reached, in 1986, to improve conditions for
death row prisoners. Hearing of the effects of the "death row syndrome," the European Court of
Human Rights decided in July 1989, in the case of Soering v. United Kingdom, that it would be a
breach of article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights to extradite the prisoner,
Soering, who would face the death penalty in Virginia because his inevitably long wait on death
row would amount to inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment. See ROGER HOOD, THE
DEATH PENALTY, A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE (Clarendon Press 1996).
The above-

mentioned Soering case (1989) can be found in 11 E.H.R.R. 439 and reprinted in 11 HUM. RTS.
L.J. 335 (1990).
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age of eighteen, unlike their tolerance of the death penalty generally.
Consequently, has this norm, prohibiting the execution of persons for crimes
committed under the age of eighteen, achieved universality?' 0
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights had the
opportunity to consider this issue in a case brought before it against the
United States in 1985.11 The petitioners, James Terry Roach and Jay
Pinkerton, had been sentenced to death for crimes which they were adjudged
to have committed before their eighteenth birthdays.
Since the United States is not a party to the American Convention on
Human Rights, the Commission applied the American Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of Man, an instrument comparable to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which is considered to have binding legal
force within the inter-American system.
The petitioners alleged that the United States had violated article I
(the right to life), article VII (special protection of children) and article
XXVI (prohibition against cruel, infamous and unusual punishment) of the
American Declaration by executing persons for crimes committed before the
age of eighteen. The facts in the case were not in dispute between the
parties.
The petition for James Terry Roach was filed on December 4, 1985.
The Commission requested the United States Secretary of State and the
Governor of the State of South Carolina to issue a stay of execution pending
the Commission's examination of the case. The requests were denied and
after the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case, Roach
was executed on January 10, 1986.
The petition for Jay Pinkerton was filed on May 8, 1986. The same
appeals were made requesting a stay of execution to the United States
Secretary of State and to the Governor of Texas. The requests were again
denied as was Pinkerton's writ certiorari by the United States Supreme Court
on October 7, 1985. Pinkerton was executed on May 15, 1986. On
February 23, 1987, the United States Supreme Court announced that in its

10. See, e.g., article 6(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
"Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of
age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women." See also article 4(5) of the American
Convention on Human Rights: "Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons who, at
the time the crime was committed, were under 18 years of age or over 70 years of age; nor shall
it be applied to pregnant women."
11. See Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser. L./V./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). The
case was reported in 8 HuM. RTS. L. 345 (1987). For a general introduction to the functioning
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, see Cecilia Medina, Procedures in the
Inter-American System for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. An Overview, 6 SNL
83 (1988).
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next term it would take up the case Thompson v. Oklahoma, for the first time
considering the constitutionality of the execution of juvenile offenders.
The issue as framed by the Commission was whether the absence of
a federal prohibition within United States domestic law on the execution of
juveniles who committed capital crimes under the age of eighteen violated
human rights standards applicable to the United States under the interAmerican system. Article I of the American Declaration protects the right to
life but is silent on the issue of capital punishment. Article 4(5) of the
American Convention on Human Rights specifically prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty on persons who were under the age of eighteen at the
time the crime was committed. However, since the United States had not
ratified the American Convention, it is not bound by its provisions.
The petitioners had argued that the United States is bound by a norm
of customary international law which prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty on persons who committed capital crimes before the age of eighteen.
They alleged that this customary norm could be derived from widespread
state practice which had been codified in certain treaties. They asserted that
"the greater the number of parties to a treaty, the greater the inference that it
2
rises to the level of customary international law."1
The United States, in response, argued that no such customary norm
existed and that it could not be considered legally bound by a conventional
norm without its consent (i.e. expressed through ratification of a treaty).
The Commission reviewed the elements necessary for the formation
of a norm of customary international law: consistent state practice and
opinio juris, and then cited the rule set forth by the International Court of
Justice to the effect that a customary rule does not bind states which protest
the norm.'3
The Commission concluded that the petitioners' argument was
unconvincing. It found that a norm of customary international law, even if it
were held to exist, would not be binding on the United States because the
United States had protested the norm. The Commission found evidence that
the United States had protested the norm in light of the fact that the Carter
Administration had proposed a reservation to the American Convention on
Human Rights when it transmitted this Convention (and three others) to the
United States Senate for ratification. The proposed reservation, as regards

12. See an article by one of the petitioners' lawyers on the case, Professor David
Weissbrodt, Execution of Juvenile Offenders by the United States Violates International Human
Rights Law, 3 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 346-52 (1988).

13. See Case No. 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser. L./V./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987), at
para. 52.
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the Roach case, stated: "U.S. adherence to Article 4 is subject to the
4
Constitution and other laws of the U.S."
For a norm to be binding on a state which protested the norm it must
have acquired the status of jus cogens, the Commission continued.15 The
Commission found that in the member states of the OAS a universal norm of
jus cogens is recognized which prohibits the state execution of children. The
norm, it stated, is accepted by all the states of the inter-American system,
including the United States.1 6 The Commission found evidence for the
recognition of this norm in the response of the United States Government to
the petition which affirmed that: "[a]ll states, moreover, have juvenile
justice systems; none permits its juvenile courts to impose the death
penalty." 7
The Commission found that the case arose, not because of doubt
concerning the recognition of an international norm as to the prohibition of
the execution of children but because the United States disputes the
allegation that there exists consensus as regards the age of majority.
Specifically what is at issue here is the United States law and practice, as
adopted by different states, to transfer adolescents charged with heinous
crimes to adult criminal court where they are tried and may be sentenced
as adults.' 8
Since the federal government did not preempt the issue, the states,
under the United States constitutional system, were free to exercise their
discretion as to whether or not to allow capital punishment and to determine
the minimum age at which a juvenile may be transferred to adult criminal
court where the death penalty could be imposed. Thirteen states and the
District of Columbia had abolished the death penalty in 1987, and the others
which permitted capital punishment had retained death penalty statutes which
1) prohibited the execution of persons who committed capital crimes under
the age of eighteen, or 2) allowed for juveniles to be transferred to adult

14. President's Message on Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, S.Exec. Doc. C,
D, E, & F, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, 17 (1978).

15. Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser. L./V./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987), at para. 54. The
concept of jus cogens is included in article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
which states: "A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character."

Id.
16. Id. at para. 56.
17. Id.

18. Id.at para. 57.
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criminal court where they could be sentenced to death. The Commission
concluded that
[w]hereas approximately ten retentionist states have now
enacted legislation barring the execution of under-eighteen
offenders, a hodgepodge of legislation characterizes the
other states which allow transfer of juvenile offenders to
adult court from age seventeen to as young as age ten, and
some states have no specific minimum age.' 9
It was this diversity of state practice within a federal system which
the Commission found violative of articles I (the right to life) and II (the
right to equality before the law) of the American Declaration. The fact that
some states had abolished the death penalty, whereas another state, Indiana,
potentially allowed it to be applied to juveniles as young as ten years of age,
was impermissible in the view of the Commission, when the most
fundamental human right, the right to life, was at stake. The violation was
not one committed by the States of South Carolina or Texas, but rather the
federal government:
For the federal Government of the United States to leave
the issue of the application of the death penalty to juveniles
to the discretion of state officials results in a patchwork
scheme of legislation which makes the severity of the
punishment dependent, not, primarily, on the nature of the
crime committed, but on the location where it was
committed. Ceding to state legislatures the determination
of whether a juvenile may be executed is not of the same
category as granting states the discretion to determine the
age of majority for purposes of purchasing alcoholic
beverages or consenting to matrimony. The failure of the
federal government to. preempt the states as regards the
most fundamental right - the right to life - results in a
pattern of legislative arbitrariness throughout the United
States which results in the arbitrary deprivation of life and
inequality before the law, contrary to Articles I and II of
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, respectively.0
The United States Government rejected the Commission's decision
in this case, which it considered not legally binding, but the United States
19. Id. at para. 58.
20. Id. at para. 63.
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Supreme Court, in its 1988 decision in Thompson v. Oklahoma, held that the
execution of juveniles under the age of sixteen violated the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment.
By way of conclusion, I wish to reiterate an earlier point. The
international consensus on the abolition of torture marked a sign in the
progress of civilization. Such a similar international consensus needs to be
reached on the issue of the abolition of the death penalty. The obstacles to
such a consensus are to be found in our outmoded, religion-burdened
concepts of justice.
The attempts of nongovernmental'human rights
organizations to achieve the abolition of the death penalty by means of
arguments suggesting that the manner in which it is imposed or the delay in
its imposition is tantamount to torture is ludicrous when the imposition of the
death penalty itself is the most extreme form of torture imaginable, but is
excluded from the definition of torture by means of a legal fiction.
Similarly, it is equally barbaric to impose the death penalty on capital
offenders who committed atrocious crimes under the age of eighteen, but it
is wishful thinking to argue that this prohibition has achieved the status of a
norm of customary international law. We need to look at crime and
punishment in a new way that does not rely for a concept of justice on the
law of retaliation.

